If it Matters, Measure it: Unpacking Diversification in Canada by Tombe, Trevor & Mansell, Robert L.
www.policyschool.ca
Volume 9 • Issue 36 • November 2016
IF IT MATTERS, MEASURE IT: UNPACKING 
DIVERSIFICATION IN CANADA
Trevor Tombe and Robert Mansell
SUMMARY
Will greater diversification benefit our economy? While many think it will, 
few are explicit about what they mean by diversification or what an “ideal” 
level would be. Even fewer recognize that favoured policies to promote 
diversification could actually do more harm than good. 
There are many ways to measure diversification in Canada, and each measure 
tells a different story. Canada’s GDP and employment, for example, are more 
diverse than many other countries, including the U.S.  Employment is also more 
diversified today than at any point in its recent history, even in resource-rich 
provinces. Perhaps surprisingly, Alberta and Saskatchewan lead the country 
in employment diversity. Even accounting for non-resource jobs that are 
indirectly linked to resources does not reveal resource-rich provinces to be 
less diverse than others. To be sure, by other measures they are less diverse 
and more volatile, so we gather and analyze a wealth of data to paint a full, 
nuanced, and sometimes surprising picture of diversification in Canada.
But does diversification even matter? Economists, for centuries, have found 
gains from specializing in areas where we have a comparative advantage. 
Subsidizing certain selected industries therefore risks causing economic 
damage by distorting activity and displacing workers and investment from 
more valuable uses. Policy-makers should therefore focus on neutral policies: 
create a favorable investment climate, facilitate adjustment and re-training, 
encourage savings (including by government), and so on. We discuss the 
pros and cons of various options.
At the end of the day, responsible governments must define their objectives 
clearly, and recognize the costs of policies meant to achieve those objectives. 
We cannot hope to have a sensible debate on economic policy without full 
and complete information. If it matters, measure it.
11 INTRODUCTION
It is a given that in a period of economic instability or slow growth there will be calls 
for diversification, to which politicians feel compelled to respond. This then provides 
the impetus for any number of government programs providing subsidies of one sort or 
another to “diversify the economy,” often with a focus on expanding one or a few sectors, 
most commonly manufacturing.1 And the greater the instability the louder are the calls for 
diversification. For example, with the downturn in Alberta’s economy, diversification is 
once again regularly listed as a top priority by the provincial government. 
At one level, this may be interpreted as simply a talking point, intended to capture the 
positive images around the very word “diversification.” In support of this, one can note 
that no definition or specific goals are typically mentioned in these policy pronouncements. 
However, the fact that there are many billions of public dollars invested in pursuit 
of economic diversification makes it a serious policy issue. As such, there are some 
fundamental questions that require answers. To start with, clarity is required with respect 
to exactly what the goal or policy objective is, precisely what diversification is, how it 
is measured, how diverse we are, and what the most cost-effective ways of promoting 
diversification are. Of course, we must also recognize that diversification may not be a goal 
worth striving for. There may very well be a trade-off between “diversity” and “prosperity.” 
It is these general questions that provide the focus in this paper. 
In a recent poll, two-thirds of Albertans said the government should consider economic 
diversification a priority.2 This is not dissimilar to the results of a poll taken in 1987 
following an earlier downturn, with almost three-quarters of Albertans then indicating the 
importance of diversification versus specialization, even though specialization may lead to 
incomes and employment that are higher on average but less stable.3 However, care must be 
taken in interpreting such polls. First, while it is not clear, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that what respondents really want is not diversification per se, but the outcomes that they 
suppose it would deliver. Perhaps the goal is greater prosperity, a less volatile economy, or 
more secure and stable employment. Diversification itself should not be the goal. Second, 
such polls typically do not mention any costs associated with diversification. When a 
direct cost was mentioned in the 1987 poll, a large majority indicated that they would be 
unwilling to pay any additional taxes to develop new diversifying activities. Further, the 
indirect costs may be large. Economists have — for centuries now — known the benefits 
of specialization. Focusing on a few productive activities based on areas of comparative 
and competitive advantage, and trading with others for all other goods and services, is 
the primary reason for our high productivity and standards of living. Indeed, such gains 
1 
An example is Justin Trudeau’s assertions that “What manufacturers and municipalities need is a partner in Ottawa to 
collaborate with them to make sure that we are diversifying our economy in all sorts of different ways, so that when 
challenges come in one sector there are other sectors to build on and to grow on, and that’s the kind of strong leadership 
that Canada needs.” See Liberal Party of Canada website, “Justin Trudeau’s Speech to the Board of Trade of Metropolitan 
Montreal,” March 3, 2015, http://www.liberal.ca/speech-by-the-leader-of-the-liberal-party-of-canada-justin-trudeau-to-the-
board-of-trade-of-metropolitan-montreal-2015/; and Susana Mas, “Justin Trudeau points to interest rate cut as proof Tories 
lack fiscal prudence,” CBC News, January 21, 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/justin-trudeau-points-to-interest-rate-
cut-as-proof-tories-lack-fiscal-prudence-1.2919992.
2 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/poll-pembina-alberta-climate-change-1.3249966.
3 
R. L. Mansell and M.B. Percy, Strength in Adversity: A Study of the Alberta Economy (Western Centre for Economic 
Research and C.D. Howe Institute, 1990), 86-93.
2are fundamental to the economic well-being of a federation such as Canada.4 But one can 
accept this general point yet remain concerned about the level of concentrated economic 
activity across sectors, products, markets, and so on. At the risk of oversimplifying the 
issue, there are two broad ways in which we can think about diversification.
First, diversification is a way to minimize economic risk and volatility in an environment of 
cyclical variability. For example, individuals can distribute their investments over a range of 
company shares and covering a range of economic sectors. In general, the variability of this 
portfolio declines as the number of such placements increases and as there are increases in 
the number of situations of negative covariance (that is, where the share prices of individual 
companies tend to move in opposite directions).5
In general, the same principle applies in an economy. If employment (or income) is 
concentrated in just one industry or sector, it will vary directly with the cyclical variations 
of that industry or sector. However, if the employment (or income) is widely distributed 
across industries, the overall variability of this “portfolio” will be reduced, particularly the 
more cases there are where activity in the sectors tends to vary in opposite directions (that 
is, where the bad times in one sector tend to be offset by good times in another).6 
A second view takes a longer-run perspective. If the economy is concentrated in industries 
that are in long-run decline there may be gains from shifting to industries with future 
growth prospects. Today, low oil prices are significantly depressing economic activity 
in Canada’s oil and gas sector. We also see growing awareness of climate issues and, 
consequently, growing calls to transition away from fossil fuels. This, in turn, may be 
justification for a more diversified economy. Businesses are also able to make such forecasts 
themselves and shift accordingly, but even in this longer-run view, governments must 
consider if there is a market failure preventing firms from making such moves, and what 
policies (if any) might help.
Regardless of which perspective is used, we require a way to measure diversification. 
After all, how else can we know whether Canada’s economy is diversified or not? Having 
a benchmark to which we can compare our current economic structure is necessary before 
any intelligent discussion of policy can begin. The analysis begins there. After proposing 
this measure, and using it with a wide variety of data, we can then see how volatile 
Canada’s provincial economies are, how that volatility has changed over time, and how 
Canada’s level of diversification compares internationally. The paper ends with a broader 
discussion that summarizes the findings and, importantly, discusses policy options available 
to governments and the critical trade-offs involved. Instead of the typical forced-growth 
policies, where chosen firms or sectors are given subsidies or preferential access to credit, 
4 
The economic surplus or overall gain associated with a federation includes the gains from: a greater degree of specialization 
and economies of scale from the reduction/elimination of barriers to interregional trade and flows of factors; the pooling 
of risks at the national level to mitigate the regional instability associated with specialization; sharing of overhead 
expenditures (for example, related to defence or large-scale infrastructure); and, the potential market power at the national 
level in dealing with other matters, such as international trade. 
5 
As an approximation, with N individual units, each accounting for 1/N of the portfolio, the portfolio variance is equal to 
(1/𝑁𝑁) × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + (1 − 1/N) × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 . So, as N increases, the portfolio variance approaches the average 
covariance. 
6 
An example is where low natural gas prices hurt the natural-gas-producing industry but help the petrochemical industry, 
which uses components of natural gas as a key input.
3there are many other instruments available to either limit economic volatility or mitigate the 
costs of such volatility on households and businesses. 
The broad message of the paper is simple: If diversification matters, then measure it. To 
that end, it asks and answers a number of related questions. How concentrated is economic 
activity in Canada? Is its economy more or less concentrated than in the recent past? Do 
resource-rich provinces like Saskatchewan and Alberta have less diverse economies? 
Is employment for Canada’s workers found only in a few sectors, with few prospects 
elsewhere? Are the markets to which our exporters sell concentrated in only a few 
countries? Is Canada’s economy in general, and its provincial economies in particular, more 
or less volatile than the recent past? And, in all these ways, how do we compare with major 
economies around the world?
2 MEASURING DIVERSIFICATION IN CANADA AND ITS PROVINCES
There is much confusion around the concept of diversification. It is a concept that is 
multifaceted and subtle and, simultaneously, simple and complex. It can be measured in 
many different ways, including using employment, incomes, or production across sectors, 
across products, or across markets. Each dimension will have a different story to tell.
Though limited by space and data, this paper provides a wide variety of measures and 
a more complete picture of diversification in Canada and its provinces. The result is a 
nuanced look at the issue, with some measures showing a region as quite diverse by one 
measure and less so by others. In any case this is a critical issue not only to policy-makers 
but for all Canadians. We must endeavor to formulate policy with evidence, not anecdotes 
or buzzwords. The goal here is to provide such data and measurements. 
2.1 A Simple and Easy Measure of Diversification
To fix ideas, consider a simple question: What are the odds that two randomly selected 
people work in the same sector? If everyone works in the same sector then this probability 
is one (100 per cent). If the labour force is evenly spread across 10sectors, say, then this 
probability is 0.1 (10 per cent). Specifically, the odds of two people both working in one 
sector — “Sector 1” — is one per cent, of both working in Sector 2 is also one per cent, and 
so on. So, the odds of selecting two people in the same sector, but any sector, is 10 per cent 
(10 times one per cent). In general, for 𝑁𝑁 sectors, this probability is
𝐻𝐻 =∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
2
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  is the share in sector 𝑖𝑖 . This expression is called the Herfindahl Index. It is 
a standard measure of concentration and, as such, a useful indicator of the degree of 
diversification in terms of a range of variables.
Next, consider another situation: a portfolio of stocks. The price of one stock may be rising 
while the price of another may be falling. Overall, we’d expect a collection of stocks to have 
less risk than any individual stock it contains. It is straightforward to show this. Imagine 
4stocks all had the same level of volatility, each randomly rising and falling from one day 
to the next, but none systematically doing this more so than others. Further suppose the 
movements of these stocks are completely independent of each other, with the odds that one 
is up for the day completely unrelated to the performance of other stocks. Of course this is 
not meant to be a statement about how stock markets really work, but nonetheless provides 
a useful intuition. 
How volatile would a collection of stocks be in this case? It is straightforward to show 
that the overall volatility of a portfolio is guaranteed to decline as we add more stocks. 
Specifically, if we hold just one of every stock and there is zero covariance among the stock 
prices, the variability of the portfolio is: 7
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉 = 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉 ÷ 𝑁𝑁, 
where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of stocks.8
In general, we can expand on this intuition by allowing our portfolio to hold different 
amounts of each stock. If the fraction of our total portfolio in stock 𝑖𝑖  is denoted 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  then:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉 = 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉 × √∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
2
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
The term on the end inside the square root is the same Herfindahl Index presented earlier.9
It is now clear how diversification and volatility are linked. If the shares 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  are very 
different, the portfolio volatility will be higher than if all the shares are the same. In fact, 
in this simple example, holding an equal amount of all stocks, which means 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1/𝑁𝑁 , 
minimizes the variance. 
In short, the Herfindahl Index (H) is a natural measure of diversification and will be used 
throughout this report. In plain English, it simply takes the shares of employment (or other 
variables such as GDP or incomes) across sectors, squares them, and then adds them up. 
One can also normalize the measure to more easily interpret the value of H.10 If 𝐻𝐻 = 1 then 
the basket of many possible items is concentrated in a single one; if 𝐻𝐻 = 0 , then the basket 
is evenly distributed across all items. 
Let’s put this measure to work.
2.2 Diversification in Canada’s Employment
The distribution of Canada’s employment across sectors has changed dramatically over 
time. In the past three decades, for example, employment has gradually — and steadily 
— moved away from the resource and manufacturing sectors and into services. This is 
common to all developed economies, and is a natural part of economic growth.
7 
As an approximation: if N units, each accounting for 1/N of the portfolio, the portfolio variance is equal to 
(1/𝑁𝑁) × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + (1 − 1/N) × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 .
8 
In this case, “volatility” means the standard deviation.
9 
In general, the linear combination of uncorrelated random variables has a variance of 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
2𝑣𝑣𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   .
10 
Specifically, in all that follows, we report 𝐻𝐻∗ = (𝐻𝐻 − 1/𝑁𝑁)/(1 − 1/𝑁𝑁) 
 
𝑁𝑁 
, where 
𝐻𝐻∗ = (𝐻𝐻 − 1/𝑁𝑁)/(1 − 1/𝑁𝑁) 
 
𝑁𝑁 is the number of sectors.
5To visualize these shifts, consider a few selected sector categories: The primary sectors 
(agriculture, mining, oil and gas, etc.), manufacturing sectors, and two large service 
sectors (health care and professional/scientific services). Figure 1 plots Canada’s share of 
employment in these sectors. 
It is well known that manufacturing employment has fallen, but it not due to an expanding 
resource sector. As mentioned earlier, a declining manufacturing sector, as a share of total 
employment and GDP, is actually a natural and global pattern of economic growth. It is 
so common it actually has a name: it’s one of the “Kuznets Facts” of growth.11 Although 
it is not worth dwelling on this point long, direct employment in the resource sector has 
not been expanding. Consider the forestry, fishing, mining, and oil and gas sectors as a 
fraction of Canada’s total employment. From a high of around three per cent in the late 
1970s the share has gradually and consistently declined to its current value of only two 
per cent of national employment. With only two per cent of Canada’s total employment 
in forestry, mining and oil and gas, it’s puzzling how one could ever think that all of 
Canada’s economic eggs are in this basket. Only one in 50 workers have jobs in those 
sectors. If we include agriculture, as Figure 1 does, we find employment within the overall 
resource sector has declined from close to eight per cent to less than four per cent today. 
Note however that this does not include the indirect employment arising from the inputs 
(machinery and equipment, construction, finance, business services, etc.) purchased by 
the resource sector or from the processing, marketing, transportation, etc. of the products 
produced by this sector.
FIGURE 1 SHARES OF EMPLOYMENT FOR SELECTED SECTORS IN CANADA
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11 
From the late Nobel-prize-winning American economist Simon Kuznets.
6If employment shares for the manufacturing and resource sectors have been falling, which 
sectors are increasing their share of total (direct) employment? Figure 1 plots two of the 
largest sectors in terms of employment-share changes: health care and professional services. 
Both have expanded dramatically since the 1970s. How about the remaining sectors? Table 
1 reports employment shares for all major sectors in Canada. Sectors that grew the most 
include health care, professional and scientific services, business services, construction, 
and accommodation and food services. The sectors that shrank the most in terms of 
employment shares include agriculture, manufacturing, and public administration.
To summarize all of these changing shares and determine whether or not Canada’s 
employment has become more or less diversified, use the Herfindahl Index. Figure 2 plots 
this index and reveals a clear pattern: Canada’s employment is less concentrated today 
than at any point in its recent history. Stated differently, the diversification of Canada’s 
employment — by this measure — is the highest in a generation. Of course, as some 
sectors expand (hiring more workers) and others shrink (losing workers), this measure 
changes. But, the overall trend of increasing employment diversification is clear.
TABLE 1 EMPLOYMENT SHARES IN CANADA, BY SECTOR
1976 2015 1976–2015
change
Agriculture 4.8% 1.7% -3.1%
Forestry, fishing, mining, quarrying, oil and gas 2.5% 2.1% -0.5%
Utilities 1.1% 0.8% -0.4%
Construction 6.8% 7.8% 1.0%
Manufacturing 19.1% 9.6% -9.5%
Wholesale and retail trade 16.5% 15.2% -1.4%
Transportation and warehousing 5.9% 5.0% -0.9%
Finance, insurance, real estate and leasing 5.2% 6.1% 0.9%
Professional, scientific and technical services 2.4% 7.6% 5.1%
Business, building and other support services 1.7% 4.2% 2.5%
Education 6.8% 7.1% 0.2%
Health care and social assistance 8.3% 12.6% 4.3%
Information, culture and recreation 3.5% 4.3% 0.8%
Accommodation and food services 4.1% 6.8% 2.7%
Other services 4.4% 4.3% -0.2%
Public administration 6.7% 5.0% -1.6%
Source: CANSIM 282-0088. Shares reflect the distribution across sectors in January of each year. 
Employment is but one aspect of economic activity, and employment shares may not reflect 
production or income differences across sectors. Oil and gas, for example, is a fairly capital-
intensive activity, so it will account for a smaller share of employment than production. In 
the next two sections we look at how diversified Canada’s real GDP and nominal GDP are 
across sectors.
7FIGURE 2 A MEASURE OF CANADA’S EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION
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Note: A normalized Herfindahl Index across sectors, using data from CANSIM 282-0088. 
2.3 Diversification of Real Economic Activity (Real GDP)
Real GDP is a measure of value-added in Canada’s economy that removes the effect of 
price changes. Simply put, consider real GDP as the quantity of physical production in 
Canada’s economy valued at some constant (historical) set of prices. It is important to 
contrast these data with nominal GDP, which includes the effect of price changes and is a 
better measure of broad sources of income. For now, consider only real economic activity; 
in the next section we’ll explore the nominal GDP data to get a measure of income diversity.
As with employment, it is useful to look at a few selected sectors. Figure 3 shows plots of 
the real GDP shares for three broad sectors: resources (agriculture, mining, oil and gas, 
etc.), manufacturing, and services. As with all developed economies, the service sector has 
become dominant, today accounting for about 80 per cent of real GDP in Canada. Since the 
1980s this share has grown a bit while the shares for the resource and manufacturing sectors 
have declined slightly. To see this clearly, given the differences in scales, Panel (b) of Figure 
3 displays the real GDP shares for the resource and manufacturing sectors. Since 2000, 
manufacturing has declined from about 16 per cent of the economy to just under 11 per cent 
today. Resources have also declined, from about 11 per cent to roughly nine per cent. 
The (direct) real GDP shares for all sectors and changes between 1981 and in 2014 are 
shown in Table 2. Unlike for sectoral employment shares, we do not see a large increase 
in the real GDP share for health care. The main sectors that expanded their contribution to 
real GDP are professional and scientific services (which also showed increased employment 
shares) and finance, insurance, and real estate. We will see later that the primary driver of 
this increase is the real estate industry.
8FIGURE 3 REAL GDP SHARES FOR SELECTED SECTORS IN CANADA
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We can use these shares and the Herfindahl Index to measure the level of economic 
diversification and changes over time. The resulting index is displayed in Figure 4. It has 
been rising, indicating that there is less diversification in Canada in terms of real GDP than 
was the case in the 1980s.12
12 
We confirm this holds in more disaggregated data, based on the three-digit NAICS industry classification codes.
9TABLE 2 REAL GDP SHARES IN CANADA, BY SECTOR
1981 2014 1981–2014
change
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting 2.3% 1.6% -0.7%
Mining, quarrying, oil and gas 9.0% 8.1% -0.9%
Utilities 3.1% 2.4% -0.7%
Construction 8.0% 7.1% -0.9%
Manufacturing 14.2% 10.6% -3.6%
Wholesale and retail trade 7.8% 11.1% 3.3%
Transportation and warehousing 4.0% 4.2% 0.2%
Finance, insurance, real estate, mgmt. 15.7% 20.2% 4.5%
Professional, scientific and technical services 2.7% 5.3% 2.6%
Administrative and support, waste management 1.9% 2.5% 0.7%
Education 7.3% 5.2% -2.1%
Health care and social assistance 7.8% 6.8% -1.0%
Information, culture and recreation 2.8% 3.9% 1.1%
Accommodation and food services 3.2% 2.1% -1.1%
Other services 1.7% 2.0% 0.3%
Public administration 8.5% 6.8% -1.7%
Source: CANSIM 379-0031 and 379-0019, both at 2007 constant prices. Adjust 379-0019 from 1997 prices to 2007 
prices based on the ratio of real GDP in the overlap year 1997.
What’s behind this change? To answer this question, we can look to a few calculations that 
reveal how individual sectors are contributing to this pattern. Panel (b) of Figure 4 plots 
various hypothetical Herfindahl indexes where the real GDP of selected sectors are held at 
their 1981 level. Specifically, this explores how Canada’s economic diversification would 
be different if there were no real GDP changes at all in resources, or in manufacturing, 
or in finance and real estate (FIRE).13 The results are clear: changes since 1981 in the 
manufacturing sector and in the mining and oil and gas sector had no material effect on 
the level or pattern of the overall Herfindahl Index. That is, the decline in the level of 
diversification in terms of Canadian real GDP since the early 1980s does not appear to be 
significantly caused by changes in the shares of either of these two large sectors. 
If the resource sector does not account for the reduced level of diversification (or increased 
level of concentration), what does? It appears to be the finance and real estate (FIRE) sector. 
Had it remained at its 1981 relative size, Canada’s real GDP diversification would have been 
greater today than in the past. So, which is it: finance or real estate? It is difficult to separate 
these two activities in the earlier years when Statistics Canada aggregated them into one. 
Instead, consider data since 1997, which reveal that finance is relatively stable, rising from 
5.6 per cent of real GDP in 1997 to six per cent today.
13 
All real GDP values are left unchanged, except for the sector selected to remain fixed at its 1981 level. Then, new GDP 
shares are calculated and the Herfindahl Index formula applied.
10
FIGURE 4 CANADA’S REAL GDP DIVERSIFICATION
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Real estate (and leasing), on the other hand, rose from 11.7 per cent in 1997 to 13.2 per cent 
today. Real estate is both much larger than the finance and insurance sectors and has grown 
by much more. What’s behind this growth? Value-added in the real estate sector is mainly 
what’s called imputed rents from owners or occupiers of homes. We live in homes and do 
not actually pay ourselves rent, but we consume the housing services provided by the home 
nonetheless. Statistics Canada attempts to estimate this value based on prevailing rental 
rates for similar homes. It turns out this accounts for the majority of the growth of the real 
estate sector’s contribution as a whole. 
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This point also allows us to reconcile our measure of employment diversification with our 
measure of real GDP diversification. With employment, we saw greater diversification over 
time. As the real estate sector’s contribution to GDP does not involve employees, real estate 
is the principal driver of falling GDP diversification in Canada.
2.4 Concentration of Income (Nominal GDP)
Let’s move on to income. As discussed earlier, real GDP is a physical measure of economic 
activity while nominal GDP is a broad measure of the total income created in an economy 
over a particular amount of time (typically one year). It is not exactly income, as it adjusts 
for things like depreciation, but it is close enough to help with intuition. Unlike real GDP 
measures just presented, nominal GDP and income do not adjust for price changes through 
time. Of course, we are focused on shares, so we do not need to worry about economy-
wide inflation. If manufacturing generates $50 billion in value-added in an economy with 
nominal GDP of $1,500 billion, then manufacturing accounts for three per cent of all 
sources of income. This is true regardless of the overall price level. But, keep in mind that 
relative prices can change over time.
TABLE 3 NOMINAL GDP SHARES, BY SECTOR
1970 1990 2011 1970–2011
change
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting 4.6% 2.9% 1.9% -2.6%
Mining, quarrying, oil and gas 4.4% 4.3% 6.1% 1.7%
Utilities 2.2% 2.9% 2.3% 0.1%
Construction 7.1% 6.8% 5.7% -1.4%
Manufacturing 21.2% 16.9% 16.9% -4.3%
Wholesale and Retail Trade 12.6% 11.9% 11.8% -0.8%
Transportation, storage, and communication 8.7% 7.2% 6.8% -1.9%
Finance and insurance 5.3% 6.0% 7.9% 2.7%
Real estate, renting, business activities 11.5% 16.7% 18.1% 6.6%
Education 6.0% 5.5% 5.0% -1.0%
Health care and social assistance 4.9% 6.5% 6.0% 1.1%
Accommodation and food services 2.5% 2.7% 2.4% -0.1%
Other services 2.5% 2.8% 3.0% 0.5%
Public administration 6.7% 6.9% 6.1% -0.6%
Herfindahl Index 0.031 0.026 0.031
Source: OECD STAN database, extended to 2011 using WIOD. 
Different data are required for this exercise to get as long a time series as possible. Statistics 
Canada does not readily make nominal GDP data for each sector available at the national 
level. Instead, we combine the OECD Structural Analysis database with more updated 
information from the World Input-Output Table. Unfortunately, this series ends in 2011 as 
this is the most recent year for which data are available. Table 3 shows the shares by sector 
for 1970, 1990, and 2011, and the changes over the entire period.
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To highlight diversification directly, the last row of the table provides the Herfindahl 
Index. There is no overall change in the overall level of diversification, although there are 
notable changes in shares across sectors. Taking the manufacturing sector as a whole, its 
share of income has declined from 21 per cent in 1970 to 17 per cent in 2011. Notice that 
resource sector did not noticeably increase its share of income over this period. The share 
for the agriculture component declined while that for mining (which includes oil and gas) 
increased, though the increase of the latter did not fully offset the decline in the former.
So which sectors increased? Not surprisingly, given the earlier discussion, we see the real 
estate sector expand its share by a remarkable 6.6 percentage points, followed by finance, 
by 2.7 per cent. Overall, the income share for the service sectors increased from 70 per cent 
of GDP in 1970 to 75 per cent today. 
2.5 Comparing Canada’s Diversification to the World
How does Canada’s level of diversification compare to other major economies in the world? 
Using the most recently available data from the World Input-Output Database (a source that 
compares internationally), it is straightforward to construct Herfindahl indexes for each 
country. The result in shown in Figure 5.
There is a common perception that Canada’s economy is relatively narrow and not highly 
diversified. However, this view is not borne out by the Herfindahl indexes measuring the 
level of concentration in terms of GDP and employment. In fact, it appears that in terms 
of both measures, the concentration levels are comparable (meaning the diversification 
levels are comparable) to those in most other large economies. Indeed, it is noteworthy 
that the level of diversification for Canada is significantly higher (or equivalently, the level 
of concentration is significantly lower) compared to some of the most highly developed 
economies, particularly that of the U.S. While this may seem surprising, it follows from 
Canada having a higher share in relatively small sectors, such as the resource sectors 
and construction, and smaller shares in relatively large sectors, such as finance or public 
administration and defence.
FIGURE 5 COMPARISON BY COUNTRY OF GDP AND EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION
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Based on these measures, the view that the Canadian economy is narrow and overly 
dependent on just a few sectors does not appear valid. The results provide important 
perspective that weakens the case, as often heard in political circles, about the urgency of 
broadening the national economy.
2.6 Employment Diversification in Canada’s Provinces
What about each of Canada’s provinces? How diversified are their economies? Have they 
become more diversified over time, just as Canada as a whole has? 
Let’s begin with employment. These data are available at the provincial level for a much 
longer period of time than is the case for provincial GDP data. Figure 6 provides the 
employment Herfindahl Index since 1976 for each of Canada’s provinces. Thick coloured 
lines highlight the key provinces. 
Notice there’s a common and persistent decline in the measure of employment 
concentration across sectors and provinces. For some provinces there is little detectable 
decline (Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia, for example) but in no province 
is there an increase in the concentration of employment (that is, a decrease in the level 
of diversification) across the 16 major sectors for which this calculation is done. This is 
completely in line with our national results. 
In addition to the generally growing or stable diversification in employment we also 
see much more similarity between provinces today than in the past. In the mid-’70s, 
Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Quebec showed higher levels of employment concentration than 
was the case in the other provinces. The decline in concentration for Ontario and Quebec 
appears to be largely due to the rising importance of service-sector employment and a 
declining share in manufacturing. For Saskatchewan, the principal driver is falling share of 
agricultural employment, from one in four jobs in the ’70s to roughly one in 15 today. 
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FIGURE 6 MEASURE OF EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION, BY PROVINCE
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Source: CANSIM 282-0088. The graph displays the Herfindahl Index across 16 major sectors separately for each 
province. Only certain provinces are highlighted. The other provinces are in light grey.
Perhaps surprisingly, Alberta and Saskatchewan currently have the most diverse 
employment. The fact that both provincial economies are currently struggling should 
provide some caution for the view that greater diversification will necessarily translate into 
greater stability. 
The results shown above focus on the distribution of direct employment across sectors. But 
many people work in one sector that supplies inputs to another. This “indirect employment” 
is important when discussing an economy’s reliance on a few particular sectors. In Alberta, 
for example, professional services, manufacturing, finance, transport, construction, and so 
on, all provide inputs to the oil and gas sector. These linkages can be very important. For 
instance, in the case of typical types of oil and gas projects, input-output data indicate that 
about one-third of the activity shows up in the oil and gas sector while about two-thirds of 
the activity shows up in other sectors. 
While it is important to take these linkages into account, it is not a simple matter to do so. 
A detailed and extensive analysis would be required and this is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it is possible to do an approximation using Statistics Canada’s estimate of 
the number of indirect jobs per direct job employed in each sector. This is known as the 
“employment multiplier.” For example, a sector with a multiplier of two would mean on 
average there are two jobs in total for each person directly employed in the sector — that is, 
one direct job plus one other indirectly. To be sure, one must interpret these multipliers with 
caution. They do not by any stretch imply that expanding employment in one sector by 10 
will cause an increase in overall employment by 20. The aggregate supply of employment 
(the number of workers) is a binding resource constraint not typically accounted for in 
input-output analysis.
One must also use the multipliers with caution even when doing a simple accounting 
exercise. Every sector has indirect jobs for which it can claim some responsibility. On 
average, the total number of direct and indirect jobs adds up to nearly twice the total 
number of workers in Canada. So we cannot just apply each sector’s multiplier to its 
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employment or we’d end up with more workers than exist. So, apply the following 
“normalization”: 
𝑒𝑒′𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 × (
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 × 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘
), 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
 denotes the share of province 𝑖𝑖 ’s direct employment in sector 𝑗𝑗 , 𝑒𝑒′𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
 denotes the 
adjusted share of direct plus indirect employment, and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
 is Statistics Canada’s jobs 
multiplier.14 The adjustment term in brackets ensures that the total direct and indirect 
employment in each sector will sum to the province’s actual total.
For many provinces, accounting for indirect employment does significantly change the 
measure of concentration (or diversification). For Alberta, however, it is clear that it makes 
a big difference. Since oil and gas in this province has a jobs multiplier of three, the 
importance of that sector for overall employment is amplified. Although even with this 
accounted for, only slightly more than 14 per cent of employment can be attributed to oil 
and gas — a share similar to Ontario’s manufacturing sector. Despite this change, Alberta’s 
measure of employment diversification is similar to that of Ontario and Quebec and ranks 
sixth overall. So, Alberta goes from the province with the most diverse employment to the 
middle of the pack. 
FIGURE 7 MEASURE OF EMPLOYMENT CONCENTRATION, BY PROVINCE, INCLUDING DIRECT AND INDIRECT  
  EMPLOYMENT FROM INPUT-OUTPUT LINKAGES (2010)
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14 
Specifically, we use the “Type-I Within-Province” jobs multiplier. These are reported in the input-output tables for 35 
sectors. This is more than the 19 we are working with from CANSIM 282-0008, so we take the simple average of the 
multipliers across all subsectors within each of the 19 broader sectors.
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2.7 GDP Diversification in Canada’s Provinces
Next, let’s turn to measuring diversification in terms of GDP within each of Canada’s 
provinces. Figure 8 displays the Herfindahl Index of GDP across 18 sectors in 2014. There’s 
a clear pattern: resource-rich provinces have more concentration (less diversification) than 
do other provinces. This is true whether we look at real or nominal GDP. The resource 
sectors are very capital-intensive so they account for far less employment than they do 
GDP, which explains why Alberta is more diversified in terms of employment than in terms 
of nominal GDP.
That being said, the resource sectors in Alberta and Saskatchewan account for a declining 
share of real economic activity. Consider Panel (a) of Figure 9, which displays the share of 
nominal GDP directly contributed by the mining and oil and gas sectors. In the late 1990s, 
they accounted for between 15 and 20 per cent of GDP in Alberta and Saskatchewan. In 
Newfoundland and Labrador — prior to fully developing its offshore fields — the share was 
only five per cent.
Over time, the shares rose dramatically — reaching almost 50 per cent in Newfoundland 
and Labrador by 2008, and about 30 per cent for Alberta and Saskatchewan at the same 
time. This rapid growth was largely due to higher commodity prices. In the late 1990s, 
commodities prices were very low relative to their pre-crisis levels. Then they crashed in 
2008–09, recovering afterwards. 
We can control for changing prices and look only at real GDP shares. Statistics Canada 
does this in CANSIM 379-0030, though we must use it with caution. The way in which 
industry prices are controlled for means that real GDP at the sector level will not sum to 
that of the overall economy. So, the level of the lines in Panel (b) should be taken with a 
small grain of salt. What the graph does show, however, is that the real GDP in mining 
and oil and gas sectors grew more slowly than the economy as a whole in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan since 1997. 
FIGURE 8 HERFINDAHL INDEX OF NOMINAL GDP, BY PROVINCE, 2015
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FIGURE 9 MINING, OIL AND GAS SHARE OF GDP, SELECTED PROVINCES
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Panel (a) - Nominal GDP
Alberta Saskatchewan Newfoundland and Labrador
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Panel (b) - Real GDP
Alberta Saskatchewan Newfoundland and Labrador
Note: Author’s calculations from CANSIM 379-0025, 379-0028, 379-0030.
Newfoundland and Labrador, on the other hand, saw a large increase as it developed its 
offshore fields; in fact, about two-thirds of the increase in the nominal GDP share of the 
mining and oil and gas sectors is due to their increased real GDP share. So production and 
quantity increases dominated the price effect for Newfoundland and Labrador. For Alberta 
and Saskatchewan, the increased nominal GDP shares are more than entirely due to higher 
oil prices.
This is much more consistent with our earlier measure of employment diversification. 
Resource sectors have actually been declining in importance in terms of their real 
economic activity, although as a source of income they have been increasing until only 
recently. In short, we’ve seen that employment and real economic activity are actually fairly 
diverse, but sources of income are less so.
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2.8 Diversification of Markets
An important determinant of stability can be the diversity of the export markets for 
the outputs of a region or nation. Let’s look beyond Canada’s borders and measure the 
diversification of our export markets. While it may very well be that employment and 
real economic activity are fairly evenly spread across sectors, as we saw for Alberta, the 
markets to which a region sells may be either highly concentrated (with most exports going 
to only a few countries) or highly diversified. We can think of the Herfindahl Index as a 
measure of the probability that two randomly selected dollars worth of exports are destined 
for the same country. We can also think of it as an economy’s exposure to economic 
shocks from abroad. To be sure, to the extent that some provinces’ exports are dominated 
by homogenous and standardized products (such as oil), it may matter less where they 
are exported if a world price prevails. Although, even for oil, price differentials exist and 
specialized export infrastructure (i.e., pipelines) are subject to location-specific political 
risks, which means diversity in export markets may nonetheless have value. 
Using recent export data for 2015 from Industry Canada,15 the Herfindahl Index for each 
province is displayed in Figure 10. Two provinces stand out in terms of the concentration 
(or lack of diversity) of their export markets: New Brunswick and Alberta. And Ontario is 
not far behind. These provinces all disproportionately export to the United States, with over 
90 per cent of New Brunswick’s exports going there, 86 per cent of Alberta’s, and just over 
80 per cent of Ontario’s. By contrast, B.C. sends just over 50 per cent of its exports to the 
United States, and much more (about a third) to the major Asian markets of China, Japan, 
South Korea, and India. The differences in export-market diversification are large. By this 
measure, there is nearly an 80 per cent chance that two randomly selected dollars worth of 
Alberta exports are destined for the same country. For B.C. and Saskatchewan, there is only 
a 30 per cent chance.
The situation for Alberta is also not improving. In 1992, for example, the same measure 
of export concentration was roughly 0.6. It grew steadily to 0.8 by 2014 before dropping 
slightly in 2015 due to low oil prices shrinking the value of Alberta’s U.S. export volumes. 
Based on this measure, the increasing calls for better market access for Alberta’s exports 
(that is, improved pipeline infrastructure to allow it to reach more destinations) seem a 
sensible way to increase this dimension of diversification.
As before, we can also compare Canada to the rest of the world. With data on bilateral 
trade shares between the largest 40 countries in the world, we can construct a comparable 
measure of export-market concentration. The results are displayed below in Panel (b). Note 
that 2011 is the most up-to-date year available from this particular dataset, although the 
broad pattern will not have changed much since.
Clearly, Canada as a whole has among the world’s least diverse trade patterns. This should 
surprise no one, given the dominance of the United States market next door. Policy-
makers also recognize this and are pursuing trade agreements with Europe (through the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), the Pacific Rim nations (through the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership), and will hopefully pursue more (especially with China). 
15 
Canada. Innovation, Science and Economic Development website, “Trade Data Online,” at https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/tdo-
dcd.nsf/eng/home.
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It is worth noting that the appropriate benchmark level of export-market diversification 
will vary by country, depending on each country’s unique geographic characteristics, 
location in the world, and so on. Even with new trade agreements, Canada’s export-market 
diversification is unlikely to approach the level of, say, Germany — nor should we want 
it to. Moreover, a country’s comparative advantage will affect its trade patterns. Overall 
economic prosperity is served by concentrating in activities that we are relatively best 
at, not in evenly spreading our resources out over sectors and markets. In any case, a full 
analysis of the pros, cons, and potential policy responses to trade diversification is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For a full discussion and analysis, interested readers should see 
recent research by Beaulieu and Song.16
FIGURE 10 MEASURE OF EXPORT-MARKET CONCENTRATION
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16 
Eugene Beaulieu and Victor Song, “What Dependency Issues? Re-Examining Assumptions about Canada’s Reliance on the 
U.S. Export Market,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper 8, 3 (January 2015).
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3 ECONOMIC VOLATILITY
This paper began by pointing out that diversification matters because it is seen as a 
determinant of the volatility of economic activity. Policy-makers hope that if our economy 
is not dominated by one sector or another, large fluctuations in employment and incomes 
can be avoided. Let’s take a look at volatility directly. Overall, we’ll see that volatility has 
fallen in Canada, both in terms of GDP and employment. We’ll also see similar declines 
for Canada’s provinces. This general trend is in line with international evidence that also 
finds economies are less volatile than in the past. Indeed, it has even been given a name: the 
“Great Moderation.” Figure 11 plots the monthly growth rates of real GDP in Canada since 
the 1960s.
Visually, we can see the decline in GDP volatility. Does the Great Moderation describe 
provincial GDP growth patterns as well? That is, are provinces experiencing lower 
volatility of GDP growth rates? Also, which provinces have the most volatile GDPs? Figure 
12 plots the standard deviation of real GDP growth rates, by province.
FIGURE 11 MONTHLY REAL GDP GROWTH RATES IN CANADA
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Note: Monthly growth rates of Canada’s real GDP from CANSIM 379-0006 and 379-0031.
For Canada, we can see the decline in recent years relative to the 1980s. Across provinces, 
we do see that resource-rich provinces have the most volatility in terms of real GDP, 
especially Newfoundland and Labrador. But, for the most part, all of Canada’s provinces 
have seen lower volatility. This includes Alberta, although not Newfoundland and Labrador, 
which is the clear (and dramatic) exception.
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FIGURE 12 VOLATILITY OF REAL AND NOMINAL GDP GROWTH, BY PROVINCE
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Source: Both figures use data from CANSIM 384-0038.
Comparing across provinces, the resource provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador do have higher levels of instability in their real GDP growth 
rates, but this is only slight. Indeed, some of the differences are due to Alberta’s higher 
average growth. The coefficient of variation in real GDP growth rates between 2001 and 
2014, for example, was 0.92 in Alberta and 1.04 in Ontario. That is, for both provinces, the 
standard deviation is about as large as average growth rates.
In the previous section, we saw the magnitude and sources of volatility in real economic 
activity — either real GDP growth rates or employment. Next, consider income or, more 
specifically, nominal GDP. The distinction between real economic volatility and income 
volatility is critically important. As we will see later, how to manage and buffer income 
volatility requires very different policy tools than what governments tend to consider when 
pursuing diversification agendas.
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Panel (b) tells a very different story, though. It is clear that the resource-rich provinces of 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland have considerably more volatile nominal GDP 
growth rates. For Alberta, it’s triple that of the country as a whole. And unlike real GDP 
growth volatility, this is not simply an artifact of higher average growth rates in these 
provinces. The coefficient of variation in Alberta is 1.12 but for Ontario is only 0.56, and for 
the country as a whole is 0.69.
FIGURE 13 VOLATILITY OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
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Finally, it’s useful to do the same examination for employment. Figure 13 plots the volatility 
of employment by province and over time. There has been a dramatic reduction in the 
volatility of employment in Alberta and B.C. since the 1980s. Overall, we see the Great 
Moderation manifesting itself both nationally and across provinces in terms of employment 
stability. Interestingly, a resource-rich province like Alberta has similar overall employment 
volatility to its neighbouring province of British Columbia.
3.1 Sources of Volatility in the Overall Economy
The previous section documents the magnitude of overall GDP and employment volatility 
in Canada and its provinces. But what sectors account for such fluctuations? To answer 
this question we must measure sectoral volatility and the covariance between each sector’s 
movements and the movements of other sectors. That is, when one sector rises or falls, 
does it tend to do so jointly with other sectors? Once these patterns are documented, there 
are fairly standard variance-decomposition techniques that will attribute overall economic 
volatility to each individual sector.
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To begin, consider a simple situation where each sector’s volatility is uncorrelated with any 
other sector. Further suppose that each sector is the same size, so each accounts for 1/𝑁𝑁 
of overall GDP. Denoting the variance of GDP in sector 𝑖𝑖 as 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2 , the variance of aggregate 
GDP is given by
𝜎𝜎2 =∑𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
2/𝑁𝑁2
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
and the contribution of sector 𝑖𝑖 to the total is therefore (𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖2/𝑁𝑁2)/𝜎𝜎2 . Now, if the sectors differ 
in size so that sector 𝑖𝑖 accounts for 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖  share of overall GDP, then overall variance would be
𝜎𝜎2 =∑𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖
2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
2
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
. 
Finally, the fully general case is where volatility of each sector is potentially correlated with 
that of each other sector. In that case, the algebra becomes more difficult, but overall GDP 
variance can be represented as 
𝜎𝜎2 =∑[𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 (∑𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
)]
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the covariance between sector 𝑖𝑖 and sector 𝑗𝑗 .17 So, in general, the contribution 
of sector 𝑖𝑖 is given by 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖(∑ 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 )/𝜎𝜎2  .
In any case, data on sectoral GDP (both real and nominal) are easily found by sector and 
year. With that, one can easily construct sectoral weights 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖  and variance-covariance terms 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Figure 14 plots the standard deviation of these annual real GDP growth rates between 
1961–2013, which correspond to 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the above equation. It also displays the 2012 share of 
overall GDP by sector, which corresponds to 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖  . The covariance terms are not provided, but 
can be constructed from the same data. Also available is nominal GDP by sector.
With these data in hand, the contribution to overall GDP volatility can be constructed. 
Figure 15 plots 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖(∑ 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 )/𝜎𝜎
2  for each of the main sectors of Canada’s economy. 
The manufacturing sector is the largest contributor to aggregate real GDP fluctuations, 
accounting for just over one-quarter of aggregate fluctuations. This shouldn’t be 
surprising, as it is the largest sector in terms of gross output and the input-output linkages 
between this sector and most others are fairly large. So, shocks to that sector translate into 
large overall effects.
Looking at nominal GDP tells a very different story. For this, those sectors exposed to 
volatile internationally determined prices, such as mining and oil and gas, unsurprisingly 
account for a much larger share. Indeed, on this measure, that particular sector accounts 
for one-quarter of Canada’s overall volatility. This is a key finding for policy-makers. 
Those concerned about smoothing aggregate economic volatility must distinguish real and 
17 
This can be more compactly expressed using matrix notation as 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝝎𝝎′𝛀𝛀𝝎𝝎  
𝝎𝝎 = [𝜔𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝜔𝑁𝑁]′ 
𝛀𝛀 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
, where 
𝜎𝜎2 = 𝝎𝝎′𝛀𝛀𝝎𝝎  
𝝎𝝎 = [𝜔𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝜔𝑁𝑁]′ 
𝛀𝛀 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is a vector collecting 
each sector’s share of GDP and 
𝜎𝜎2 = 𝝎𝝎′𝛀𝛀𝝎𝝎  
𝝎𝝎 = [𝜔𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝜔𝑁𝑁]′ 
𝛀𝛀 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is the matrix collecting all variance and covariance terms (the 
𝜎𝜎2 = 𝝎𝝎′𝛀𝛀𝝎𝝎  
𝝎𝝎 = [𝜔𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝜔𝑁𝑁]′ 
𝛀𝛀 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 row and 
𝜎𝜎2 = 𝝎𝝎′𝛀𝛀𝝎𝝎  
𝝎𝝎 = [𝜔𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝜔𝑁𝑁]′ 
𝛀𝛀 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 column is
𝜎𝜎2 = 𝝎𝝎′𝛀𝛀𝝎𝝎  
𝝎𝝎 = [𝜔𝜔1 … , 𝜔𝜔𝑁𝑁]′ 
𝛀𝛀 
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ).
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nominal volatility. Nominal GDP variation may be better ameliorated through insurance-
type policies that save more in good times, provide short-term support to those whose 
incomes have fallen, and other measures that soften the blow of cyclical shocks, rather than 
with policies that attempt to structurally change the overall economy.
FIGURE 14 VOLATILITY OF GDP GROWTH AND SHARE OF TOTAL GDP, BY SECTOR
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Note: Plots the standard deviation of annual real GDP growth rates between 1961 and 2012, and the share of 2012 overall 
GDP. The source for both data is CANSIM Table 383-0021. 
Of course, as we’ve repeatedly seen throughout this report, the manufacturing sector has 
declined in importance and therefore the effect of shocks to that sector on overall GDP 
have also declined. In 1981, the contribution of manufacturing to overall volatility was 
much larger. Figure 16 compares the contribution to overall real GDP volatility by each 
sector using both the 1981 GDP weights and the 2012 weights. The drop in manufacturing 
partly explains why Canada’s overall GDP volatility has shrunk. Indeed, recent research 
has documented this same result for the United States.18 Diversifying the economy away 
from manufacturing and towards services may have contributed in no small part to the 
Great Moderation.
18 
Vasco Carvalho and Xavier Gabaix ,“The Great Diversification and Its Undoing,” American Economic Review 103, 5 (2013): 
1697-1727.
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FIGURE 15 CONTRIBUTION OF EACH SECTOR TO CANADA’S OVERALL GDP VOLATILITY
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Note: This graph plots the contribution to aggregate GDP volatility for each of the main sectors in Canada. It is based on 
data from CANSIM 383-0032; see text for details. 
FIGURE 16 CONTRIBUTION OF EACH SECTOR TO CANADA’S OVERALL GDP VOLATILITY
 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
Sh
ar
e 
of
 A
gg
re
ga
te
 V
ol
at
ili
ty
1981 GDP Weights 2012 GDP Weights
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4 DISCUSSION AND POLICY OPTIONS
Calls for “diversification” are a very predictable response to economic volatility or slow 
growth. Equally predictable are the political responses promising to deliver diversification. 
Unfortunately, there are some troubling patterns in these responses. First, it is rarely clear 
what exactly is meant by and what would actually constitute diversification. Second, 
given the lack of definition and measurement as a starting point, there is no sense of how 
diversified (or undiversified) the existing economy actually is. If we think we desire more 
diversification, it is important to measure its current level to establish the starting point, 
trends, shortfalls and progress. But this step seems to be missing. Third, it is not clear 
why the policy goal should be diversification rather than something like “greater stability,” 
which could be achieved by policies other than diversification of the economic structure. 
Fourth, if the policy goals are for more diversification, where are the estimates of costs and 
benefits to justify the policies?
To begin to address some of these fundamental issues, this analysis noted that there are a 
number of dimensions to economic diversification and, using an index of concentration, 
estimated levels and changes in the degree of diversification for these dimensions. The 
general conclusions from this analysis can be summarized as follows:
• Contrary to common perception, the level of diversification with respect to Canadian 
employment has been increasing over time and is currently greater than at any point 
in recent history. In comparison to most other countries Canada also ranks near the 
top in terms of diversification of employment, even higher than the U.S. Measuring 
diversification in terms of output (or real GDP), there has been a slight decline in 
diversity, but this decrease is primarily due to the rapidly increasing share of imputed 
rents for Canadian housing and, consequently, increased shares for the real estate 
component of the finance insurance and real estate sector. In terms of income (or 
nominal GDP), the level of diversification has been stable but would actually show an 
increase if the growing shares for imputed housing rents were factored out. 
• The pattern for diversification of direct employment across the provinces is one of 
increasing diversity and convergence to the point where there are relatively small 
differences among the provinces. However, when we take into account both the 
direct and indirect employment associated with each of the sectors, the level of 
diversification in Alberta is significantly reduced, albeit still in line with that for 
Ontario and Quebec. If we focus on just income, then Newfoundland, Saskatchewan 
and Alberta stand out as having more concentration (or less diversity) than the other 
provinces.
• Another important dimension is diversification with respect to export markets. 
Here, Canada is among the countries with the least diversity in export markets. At a 
regional level, New Brunswick and Alberta share the distinction of having the least 
export-market diversity, with Ontario not far behind. 
• If the focus is shifted from examining the level and changes in diversification to 
examining the level of economic volatility (a more meaningful policy concern), it is 
clear that the trend over time has been one of decreasing variability. This trend also 
holds for the individual provinces, but the levels of variability in terms of real GDP 
are still higher than average in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, while the 
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variability of employment is above average for Newfoundland and Prince Edward 
Island. In general the largest contributors to volatility across the regions are the 
manufacturing sector, followed by mining and oil and gas, construction, and finance 
and real estate.
• In evaluating the level of diversification for the provinces it is helpful to provide a 
summary for the various dimensions. For this purpose, Table 4 provides a ranking 
of the measure of diversification across the provinces and across the four dimensions 
discussed above in Section 2. As shown there, whether a provincial economy can 
be considered more or less diversified compared to that of other provinces depends 
heavily on which dimension is used. At the same time, it is clear that aggregating 
across dimensions reveals that the Western Canadian provinces tend to rank higher 
in terms of diversification than those in Central Canada, contrary to common 
perceptions.
TABLE 4 RANKING DIVERSIFICATION ACROSS PROVINCES
  Diversification Rank, by Province and Metric
  Direct Employment Direct and Indirect 
Employment
Nominal
GDP
Export Markets Mean Reciprocal Rank
SK 2 1 9 2 1.9
BC 3 2 5 1 2.0
MB 7 8 1 5 2.7
AB 1 5 8 9 2.8
NB 6 3 3 10 4.3
QC 9 10 2 7 4.7
PE 5 9 6 3 4.9
ON 4 7 4 8 5.2
NS 8 4 7 6 5.8
NL 10 6 10 4 6.5
Note: Ranks the provinces from most diverse (rank of one) to least diverse (rank of 10) across each of the four main 
metrics examined in Section 2. The mean reciprocal rank is a common method of aggregating rank lists — it is 
equivalently the harmonic mean of each province’s rank across the four metrics.
4.1 The Potential Trade-Off Between Diversification and Productivity
Let’s begin our discussion of policy options on a cautionary note. There are potentially 
many ways to increase the level of diversification in the economy. The most common 
view is that it should involve changing the industrial structure, usually by providing some 
type of subsidy to enhance particular sectors. A government could, for example, provide 
preferential access to credit or other inputs, or perhaps even provide direct subsidies. To 
achieve the goal of increased diversification these supports would be directed at currently 
smaller sectors. As these smaller sectors grow as a result of the support, they draw workers 
and other inputs away from other areas of the economy. It is in this way that diversification 
could increase. But it comes at a cost.
In a well-functioning market, the allocation of workers, inputs, investment and so on, is 
determined by prices. Productive firms or sectors able to pay higher wages, for example, 
will naturally hire more workers and expand in size relative to other firms or sectors. 
The natural equilibrium allocation will tend to maximize productivity and incomes. 
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Government subsidies distort this allocation by allowing firms or sectors that would not 
otherwise attract workers to hire those workers nonetheless. Concretely, a firm may have 
tasks that generate only $20 per hour in revenue. It would make little sense to hire a worker 
for $25 per hour unless there are subsidies available to make up the difference. The workers 
this subsidized firm manages to attract, however, must come from somewhere — and 
those firms or sectors not receiving a subsidy (or supplying sufficiently many inputs to the 
subsidized sector) will lose workers. These displacement effects can be very costly.
Sometimes a simple illustration helps. Consider a world with two sectors. Workers are 
free to move between the two sectors, but with each additional worker employed the less 
value an additional worker will create. Imagine Walmart, where the first workers stock 
the shelves or operate the cash registers. These are valuable tasks for the store. As more 
workers are hired, however, they occupy progressively lower-value tasks, such as greeting 
customers at the front door. The firm will stop hiring when all tasks worth more than the 
prevailing wage rate are filled. Figure 17 below illustrates such a natural equilibrium, with 
the initial allocation of workers between the two sectors being determined by the prevailing 
initial wage rate. Now, imagine a government program diverts workers from the sector 
on the left to the sector on the right. The expanding sectors begin operating tasks that are 
worth less than the tasks available in the contracting sector. The gains in green are lower 
than the losses in red. The net result is a decrease in overall economic activity. 
FIGURE 17 STYLIZED ILLUSTRATION OF LOSSES FROM MISALLOCATING WORKERS
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Note: Illustrates how shifting workers from one sector to another results in overall losses. The value of the last worker 
hired in each sector is the same when market function well. A subsidy allows the sector on the right to expand 
employment into progressively lower-valued tasks. The resulting loss of employment in the sector on the left means 
relatively higher-valued tasks are lost.
Of course, this is just an illustration to build intuition, but the general result is sound: 
A subsidy that expands one sector comes at the costs of contractions elsewhere; absent 
a market failure, this reallocation will tend to lower overall productivity and harm the 
economy.
To be sure, markets do not always function well. Perhaps there are credit-market failures 
demanding a government response. Perhaps there are positive spillover benefits from 
certain sectors that justify a subsidy. But the onus is on policy-makers to state precisely 
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what the market failure is to justify a subsidy. Invoking “economic diversification” alone is 
not itself sufficient. If that is all that justifies a policy, then the increased diversification will 
come only at the cost of a smaller overall economy.
4.2 Other Policy Options and Concluding Thoughts
A key point coming out of the analysis in this paper is that, from a policy perspective, 
it is most important to keep the focus on a laudable goal of reducing the volatility in 
employment and incomes, rather than diversification. Diversification is but one potential 
way of obtaining this outcome but may well entail large costs and few benefits in terms 
of the stability goal. An example is the common preoccupation with enhancing the 
manufacturing sector relative to the resource sector to generate greater stability when, in 
fact, the former tends to exhibit greater cyclical and long-term volatility than the latter. 
Further, by most measures the Canadian economy is already highly diversified and, with 
some exceptions, so are the provinces. And one should question the logic that every region 
(including metropolitan areas) should be highly (and equally) diversified rather than have 
economies that exploit the gains from comparative advantage and specialization. In a 
well-functioning federation, the focus would be more on offsetting the volatility associated 
with specialization by, for example, more highly developed “insurance-type” policies. 
Particularly in the case of cyclical volatility, these would allow regions to more easily 
accommodate the ups and downs while still achieving the higher incomes associated with 
an economy based on comparative advantage. 
Much has been written on effective policy approaches for dealing with economic 
variability. 19 There is insufficient space here to review all of the details, but a few 
important themes are worth highlighting. In general, rather than focus on attempting to 
engineer or re-engineer an industrial structure to focus more on some politically selected 
and favoured sectors, all on the assumption that this will lead to greater stability while 
promoting prosperity, the focus should be more generally on: 
• Creating a favourable investment climate, including policies aimed at building 
on existing comparative advantage or where there is clear evidence that such an 
advantage can realistically be created and sustained. Uncertainty is the enemy of 
investment and much can be gained by focusing on creating an environment of 
high quality social and physical infrastructure and stable and predictable economic 
policies. 
• Limiting sector-shifting policies to cases where there are documented cases of market 
failure. Absent a market failure, subsidies to favoured sectors may very well increase 
economic diversity, but only at the cost of a smaller overall economy.
• Promoting policies that facilitate adjustment and encourage behaviours appropriate 
to an environment of inevitable economic variability. These include policies to 
encourage more saving in the good times, lower debt-to-income levels and policies to 
reduce a general tendency of government spending to be pro-cyclical. 
19 
A summary can be found in Mansell and Percy, Strength in Adversity, Chapter 5. 
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• Ensuring pre-existing policies are not themselves causing a concentration in 
relatively few sectors. For example, it has been suggested that not tying royalties to 
a benchmark industry-wide average cost of extraction when calculating resource 
rents may lead to an incentive to over-invest in extraction.20 More generally, targeted 
tax policies, such as accelerated depreciation, may encourage over-expansion of a 
particular sector that ultimately increases adjustment costs once a correction begins. 
It is with these points in mind that government, commentators, and indeed all Canadians 
should evaluate future economic-diversification policies. But at the end of the day, 
critical public policy debates deserve full and complete information. Governments have a 
responsibility to define the objectives they have in mind. Diversification means different 
things in different situations, depending on how it’s measured. Absent a clear goal, 
proposed policy solutions risk being counterproductive. So, on this file especially: If it 
matters, measure it.
20 
Recent changes to Alberta’s royalty framework apply average cost benchmarks for conventional oil and gas extraction, 
although the oilsands formula does not. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, and recent royalty changes, see Blake 
Shaffer, “Lifting the Hood on Alberta’s Royalty Review,” University of Calgary School of Public Policy Briefing Paper 9, 7 
(February 2016).
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